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ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION 
Paul O’Connell* 
 
ABSTRACT: There is a marked disjuncture today between the generalised critique 
and rejection of human rights by many progressive and critical commentators, and 
the embrace of the language of human rights by a variety of movements around the 
world engaged in struggles for social change. This divide between critical theory and 
critical practice raises important questions about whether and how movements for 
fundamental social change should engage with human rights. In contrast to a 
number of well-established critical dismissals of rights, this article argues, from 
within the Marxist tradition, that human rights can, and in some cases should, be 
deployed by social movements in their campaigns. However, reaching this 
conclusion requires developing an understanding of human rights that gives primacy 
to social struggle and to a nuanced understanding of the contradictory nature of 
human rights.  
 
 




Critiques of human rights abound.1 This is by no means a recent development,2 but the 
very ubiquity of the language of human rights in our age,3 means that a plethora of critiques 
of human rights have proliferated over the last forty years. While it is true that such 
critiques arise from various points along the ideological and political spectrum—at times 
making strange bedfellows of critical theorists and reactionary politicians—what we might, 
broadly, term ‘the left’ has provided particularly fertile ground for critical accounts of 
human rights.4 Notwithstanding these critiques, and a recent spate of declarations about 
                                                 
* Reader in Law, SOAS University of London. I am grateful to Daniel Attenborough, Samia Bano, Umut 
Özsu, Alfredo Saad-Filho, Nimer Sultany and Jen Wilkinson for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier 
drafts of this article; as ever, responsibility for any remaining shortcomings of style or substance are mine 
alone. 
1 For a summary of some of the main critiques of human rights see: David Chandler, ‘Contemporary 
Critiques of Human Rights’ in Goodhart (ed), Human Rights: Politics and Practice (2nd edn, OUP 2013) 107. 
2 Jeremy Waldron (ed), Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on The Rights of Man (Routledge 1987). 
3 The ‘rhetoric of human rights is omnipresent in the contemporary world’. Amartya Sen. ‘The Global Reach 
of Human Rights’ (2012) 29 Journal of Applied Philosophy 91, 91. Similarly, Moyn notes that human rights are 
‘one of the most central notions … of our time’. Samuel Moyn, Human Rights and the Uses of History (Verso 
2014) xii. 
4 Anthony Chase, ‘The Left on Rights: An Introduction’ (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1541; Duncan Kennedy, 
‘The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies’ in Brown and Halley (eds), Left Legalism/Left Critique (Duke 
University Press 2002) 178. 
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the demise of human rights,5 social movements around the world continue to frame their 
struggles and demands, at least partly, through the language of human rights. This can be 
seen in struggles for housing in Spain and South Africa,6 land in Brazil,7 racial equality in 
the US,8 or water in Ireland,9 to name but a few. This presents us with an interesting 
disjuncture. Throughout the world millions of people are attempting to confront the 
misery and injustices heaped upon them by the contemporary global order through, in part, 
mobilising the language of human rights to advance and defend their interests. At the same 
time, many of the putative critics of this extant global order disdain, by implication, such 
efforts through a sometimes bald,10 sometimes sophisticated,11 critique and dismissal of 
human rights.  
 
This disjuncture—between critical theory and critical practice—raises a number of crucial 
questions about the relationship between ideas and social movements, law and struggles 
to bring about social change, and, for present purposes, about the role of human rights in 
emancipatory politics. It raises, at a critical historical juncture,12 the fundamental question 
of how individuals and groups committed to fundamental social change should engage 
with human rights. The argument developed here, put briefly, is that while many of the 
critiques of human rights raise important concerns, they fail to meaningfully address the 
central question of the relationship between human rights and social struggles. In contrast 
to such critiques, it will be argued here that human rights can and should be deployed in 
emancipatory political projects today, but that reaching such a conclusion requires us to 
                                                 
5 Stephen Hopgood, The Endtimes of Human Rights (Cornell University Press, 2013); and Eric Posner, The 
Twilight of Human Rights Law (OUP 2014). 
6 Ada Colau and Adrià Alemany, Mortgaged Lives: From the Housing Bubble to the Right to Housing (The Journal of 
Aesthetics & Protest 2014); and Jackie Dugard, Tshepo Madlingozi and Kate Tissington, ‘Rights 
Compromised or Rights Savvy? The Use of Rights-Based Strategies to Advance Socio-Economic Struggles 
by Abahlali baseMjondolo, the South African Shack-Dwellers Movement’ in Garcia, Klare and Williams 
(eds), Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice (Routledge 2015) 23. 
7 Peter Houzager, ‘The Movement of the Landless (MST), Juridical Field, and Legal Change in Brazil’ in 
Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito (eds), Law and Globalization From Below (CUP 2005) 218. 
8 Fredrick Harris, ‘The Next Civil Rights Movement?’ (2015) 63(3) Dissent 34.  
9 Dan Finn, ‘Ireland’s Water Wars’ (2015) 95 New Left Review 49. 
10 Slavoj Zizek, ‘Against Human Rights’ (2005) 34 New Left Review 115.   
11 Costas Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire (Routledge-Cavendish 2007). 
12 The stakes of the current historical period—characterised by the general crisis of capitalism—are brought 
into sharp relief by Immanuel Wallerstein, who argues that: ‘We may think of this period of systemic crisis 
as an arena of struggle for the successor system … We are faced with alternative choices which cannot be 
spelled out in institutional detail, but may be suggested in broad outline. We can choose collectively a new 
system that essentially resembles the present one: hierarchical, exploitative and polarizing … Alternatively 
we can choose a radically different system, one that has never previously existed—a system that is relatively 
democratic and relatively egalitarian’. Immanuel Wallerstein, 'Structural Crises' (2010) 62 New Left Review 133, 
140-141. 
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go beyond narrow, formalistic and overly juridical concepts of what human rights are, and 
stress the centrality of social and political struggle in the formulation and defence of human 
rights.13 
 
As the positive argument for human rights in emancipatory politics developed here draws 
from and situates itself within the Marxist tradition, the article begins by setting out some 
of the key Marxist debates on the question of human rights. The aim here is to elucidate 
some of the interesting discussions that have taken place within Marxism, and to establish 
a basis for defending human rights from within the Marxist tradition. In the next section 
the main lines of a number of critiques of human rights, associated with Critical Legal 
Studies, will be sketched, to both demonstrate their importance and to raise some 
reservations about their veracity and efficacy. In the penultimate section, a positive case 
will be set out for the deployment of human rights in emancipatory political movements 
and projects today. As will become clear, this is by no means a blanket defence of human 
rights—even less so of dominant human rights discourses and practices—but rather a 
qualified case for human rights in emancipatory politics, premised on a fundamental shift 
in how we conceive the politics of human rights.  
  
II. MARXIST DEBATES ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
There is a well-established common-sense that Karl Marx was an implacable critic of 
human rights, and that as a consequence the Marxist tradition is one that is inhospitable 
to claims for human rights.14 As is often the case with such common-sense positions, this 
is not true. There are, of course, statements that Marx made which could be interpreted as 
evincing a rejection of human rights, and there have been some in the Marxist tradition 
who have explicitly rejected human rights.15 But the reality is that notwithstanding his own 
                                                 
13 ‘Efforts to achieve human rights practice should be understood as struggles over power and resource that 
are often waged against or in spite of states and other powerful interests … the specific history of struggles 
to achieve human rights practice suggests that grassroots organising and direct action, including forms of 
open resistance and disobedience, typically involving networks of nongovernmental (NGO), social 
movement (SMO), and community organisations, are the most commonly successful approaches … 
to realising human rights in any lasting, meaningful way’. William T. Armaline, Davita Silfen Glasberg and 
Bandana Purkayastha, The Human Rights Enterprise (Polity Press 2015) 14-15. 
14 Leszek Kolakowsk, ‘Marxism and Human Rights’ (1983) 112 Daedalus 81; and L.J. Macfarlane, ‘Marxist 
Theory and Human Rights’ (1982) 17 Government and Opposition 414. 
15 See, for example, Isaac Balbus, ‘Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the “Relative Autonomy” 
of the Law’ (1977) 11 Law & Society 215. 
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ambitions, Marx (and has long-time collaborator Friedrich Engels) never developed a well 
worked out, detailed and consistent theory of law, state and rights.16  
 
Consequently, Marx’s views on rights are, for the most part, incomplete, inconsistent and 
ambiguous. Similarly, the broad Marxist tradition encompasses a range of views about 
whether Marxists can or should support human rights, and these arguments are also 
marked by the absence of a single, consistent line. This section provides an overview of 
Marx’s main statements and arguments about human rights, before tracing some of the 
key debates within the Marxist tradition on the question of human rights. Finally, this 
section concludes by arguing that it is ambiguity and inconsistency, from Marx onwards, 
that defines the Marxist approach to human rights. Therefore, it will be argued here that 
there is ample room within Marxism as a tradition committed to human emancipation,17 
for supporting and engaging with human rights, notwithstanding certain critical currents 
within Marx’s own work, and that of later Marxists. 
 
i. Marx on Rights 
The necessary starting point for thinking about Marx’s position on human rights is his 
1843 essay On the Jewish Question.18 This essay was written as a response to Bruno Bauer’s 
argument that if Jewish people in Germany were to receive political emancipation, the 
same civil and political rights as other Germans,19 they must first renounce (or, from 
Bauer’s perspective, emancipate themselves) from Judaism. In an excoriating critique of 
Bauer’s argument, Marx also engaged in a general reflection on the nature of rights as such. 
Crucial to Marx’s analysis of rights, and their limitations, is the distinction he draws 
                                                 
16 As Fine notes, Marx never ‘pursued his critique of jurisprudence to the same systematic extent to which 
he pursued his critique of political economy’. Bob Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Marx's Critique of the 
Legal Form (The Blackburn Press, 1984) 5. Similarly, Hunt argues that ‘the whole of the classical Marxist 
tradition bequeathed a deathly silence about the constitutional and legal problems that must inevitably 
confront any project of socialist construction’. Alan Hunt, ‘A Socialist Interest in Law’ (1992) I/192 New 
Left Review 105, 110. 
17 For Fromm ‘the very aim of Marx is to liberate man from the pressure of economic needs, so that he can 
be fully human’, consequently Marxism is, first and foremost, a theory for human emancipation. Erich Fromm, 
Marx’s Concept of Man (Continuum 2004) 3. 
18 Karl Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’ in Tucker (ed), The Marx-Engels Reader (2nd edn, W.W. Norton & Co. 
1978) 26. For useful reflections on this work, see: Stathis Kouvelakis, ‘The Marxian Critique of Citizenship: 
For a Rereading of On the Jewish Question’ (2005) 104 South Atlantic Quarterly 707; and Wendy Brown, 
‘Rights and Identity in Late Modernity: Revisiting the “Jewish Question”’ in Sarat and Kearns (eds), Identities, 
Politics and Rights (University of Michigan Press 1997) 85. 
19 This was ‘the Jewish Question’, as Rühle notes, those ‘who then used this phrase, had in mind the political 
and civic liberation of the Jews from their exceptional position before the law, a position which was a relic 
of the Middle Ages’. Otto Rühle, Karl Marx: His Life and Work (Allen and Unwin 1929) 62. 
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between political emancipation and human emancipation. The former can be achieved by 
the conferral of civil and political rights, but is formal and limited; the latter is substantive, 
genuine and can only be achieved through transcending existing social relations 
(capitalism), and collapsing the division between political citizens active in and through the 
state and private individuals who exist in ‘civil society’. 20 
 
Starting from this premise, Marx argues that ‘the so-called rights of man, as distinct from the 
rights of the citizen, are simply the rights of a member of civil society, that is, of egoistic man, of 
man separated from other men and from the community’.21 To demonstrate this, Marx 
identifies what he sees as the core rights in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen (equality, liberty, security and property) and sets out to show the necessarily 
truncated nature of each of these rights within the capitalist system. So, for example, he 
argues that ‘liberty as a right of man is not founded upon relations between man and man, 
but rather upon separation of man from man. It is the right of such separation. The right 
of the circumscribed individual, withdrawn into himself’.  
 
In a similar vein, he argues that property is ‘the right of self-interest’ which ‘leads every 
man to see in other men, not the realization but rather the limitation of his own liberty’. 
Equality, in this context, is merely the guarantee that ‘every man is equally regarded as a 
self-sufficient monad’, while security is the guarantee of each selfish, isolated individual’s 
property.22 In light of this, Marx concludes that 
 
None of the supposed rights of man, therefore, go beyond the egoistic man, 
man as he is, as a member of civil society; that is, an individual separated 
from the community, withdrawn into himself, wholly preoccupied with his 
private interest and acting in accordance with his private caprice. Man is 
far from being considered, in the rights of man, as a species-being; on the 
contrary, species-life itself—society—appears as a system which is external 
to the individual and as a limitation of his original independence. The only 
bond between men is natural necessity, need and private interest, the 
preservation of their property and their egoistic persons.23 
                                                 
20 ‘Political emancipation certainly represents a great progress. It is not, indeed, the final form of human 
emancipation, but it is the final form of human emancipation within the framework of the prevailing social 
order’. Marx (n 18) 35 [original emphasis]. 
21 ibid 42. 
22 ibid 42-43. 
23  ibid 43. Marx and Engels would, in later years, decry the narrow egotism and truncated freedom 
characteristic of life under capitalism in very similar terms: ‘The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper 
hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal 
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In sum Marx argues that the rights of man do not, in substance, reflect genuine human 
emancipation. Instead, while purporting to emancipate individuals they are, in fact, 
constitutive of a set of social relations that denies individuals the capacity to realise their 
true nature (species-being) as social beings. Real emancipation will only take place when 
the social relations of capitalism are transcended, and the distinctions between formal 
political freedom and action in the ‘private’ sphere are replaced by genuine community.24 
 
Clearly, this critique of rights lends itself to the idea that Marx, and Marxists, can and 
should reject human rights. However, the important exposition of the limitations of rights 
that Marx undertook here is only part of the story. It must be remembered that the entire 
purpose of this intervention by Marx was to dispute the arguments of Bauer and to defend 
the claim that Jewish people in Germany should be granted equal citizenship, that is to say 
equal rights.25 Of course, the entire tenor of Marx’s argument is that granting civil and 
political rights to Jewish people in Germany will not lead to their emancipation—
substantively—any more than it will or has done for any other group. In this sense, the 
essence of Marx’s critique is that political emancipation ‘is not the final and absolute form 
of human emancipation’.26  
 
With that said, he acknowledges that the limited form of political emancipation provided 
by the attainment of the rights of man ‘certainly represents a great progress. It is not, 
indeed, the final form of human emancipation, but it is the final form of human 
emancipation within the framework of the prevailing social order’.27 In light of this, On the 
                                                 
ties that bound man to his “natural superiors”, and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man 
than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment”. It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious 
fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It 
has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered 
freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom – Free Trade’. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
The Communist Manifesto (Penguin Books 1967) 222. 
24 ‘Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man has absorbed into himself the 
abstract citizen; when as an individual man, in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, he has 
become a species-being; and when he has recognized and organized his own powers (forces propres) as social 
powers so that he no longer separates this social power from himself as political power’. ibid 46 [original 
emphasis]. 
25  Justine Lacroix and Jean-Yves Pranchère, ‘Karl Marx Fut-il Vraiment un Opposant Aux Droits de 
L’homme?’ (2012) 62 Revue Française de Science Politique 433, 436. 
26 Marx (n 18) 32 [original emphasis]. 
27 ibid 35. 
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Jewish Question can definitely be seen as a cutting critique of the limitations of rights within 
capitalism, but hardly represents a complete rejection of human rights, as such. 
 
A stronger, and apparently more clear cut, dismissal of rights can be found some years 
later in The German Ideology, which Marx co-authored with Friedrich Engels, and in which 
they argue that as ‘far as law is concerned, we with many others have stressed the 
opposition of communism to law, both political and private, as also in its most general 
form as the rights of man’.28 While this unequivocal statement definitely tallies with the 
idea that Marx rejected bourgeois law and rights,29 it is not, as presented, part of a well 
thought out argument or theory. It stands, therefore, as more aphorism than analysis and, 
consequently, should not be read as dispositive.  Later still, we see Marx again register his 
reservations about appeals to rights in his Critique of the Gotha Program.30 Here, again, Marx 
criticises the limitations of ‘bourgeois right’ – in particular the inability of formal, legal 
equality to account for substantive real world differences between individuals and classes.31 
This, in turn, means that the language of equality, and formal guarantees of equal right, in 
fact serve to conceal and entrench substantive inequality.32 Marx concludes his critique of 
the Gotha Program by dismissing the idea of equal rights as ‘dogmas, ideas which in a 
certain period had some meaning but have now become obsolete verbal rubbish’ and been 
reduced to mere ‘ideological nonsense’.33  
 
Though highly critical of the concept of right as used in the Gotha Program, Marx also 
acknowledges that right ‘can never be higher than the economic structure of society and 
                                                 
28 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Marx-Engels Collected Works: Volume 5 (Lawrence & Wishart 2010) 209. 
29 Steven Lukes, ‘Can a Marxist Believe in Human Rights?’ (1981) 4 Praxis International 334, 338. 
30 Karl Marx, ‘Critique of the Gotha Program’ in Tucker (ed), The Marx-Engels Reader (2nd edn, W.W. Norton 
& Co. 1978) 525. 
31 In this regard, Marx argues that ‘equal right is an unequal right for unequal labor. It recognizes no class 
differences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone else; but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual 
endowment, and thus productive capacity, as a natural privilege. It is, therefore, a right of inequality, in its 
content, like every right. Right, by its very nature, can consist only in the application of an equal standard; 
but unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal) are measurable 
only by an equal standard insofar as they are brought under an equal point of view, are taken from one 
definite side only -- for instance, in the present case, are regarded only as workers and nothing more is seen in 
them, everything else being ignored. Further, one worker is married, another is not; one has more children 
than another, and so on and so forth. Thus, with an equal performance of labor, and hence an equal in the 
social consumption fund, one will in fact receive more than another, one will be richer than another, and so 
on. To avoid all these defects, right, instead of being equal, would have to be unequal’. ibid 530-531. 
32 ibid 530. 
33 ibid. 
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its cultural development conditioned thereby’,34 or, in other words, that equal rights, as 
such, can never challenge the inherent inequalities produced by the capitalist system. Marx 
concludes by noting that only when capitalism is transcended and a truly new form of 
society has begun to consolidate itself ‘can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be 
crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banner: From each according to his ability, 
to each according to his needs!’.35 As with On the Jewish Question, Marx could be read here 
as rejecting rights, or, he can be seen as engaging in a thorough and necessary critique of 
blind faith in rights. Bringing to the fore the ways in which the unfreedom produced by 
capitalism structurally and necessarily frustrates the high ideals contained in appeals to 
human rights,36 without necessarily constituting a rejection of rights tout court. 
 
This latter interpretation gains credence from the fact that throughout their lives both 
Marx and Engels, while entertaining no illusions on the matter, wrote repeatedly in defence 
of the rights to free expression, protest and the right to vote. From an early age Marx was 
an ardent critic of censorship, and defender of freedom of expression. For example, in 
1842 he wrote in opposition to a proposed Prussian censorship law on the basis that 
‘censorship is a permanent attack on the rights of private persons, and still more on ideas’.37 
At a later stage, commenting on the Paris Commune of 1871, Marx registered a powerful 
defence of the right to universal suffrage,38 while Engels wrote on a number of occasions 
decrying inroads on the right to protest in England, a right which he considered to be ‘one 
of the most precious rights of … working people’, which ought to be defended at all 
costs.39 
 
                                                 
34 ibid 531. 
35 ibid. 
36 As Roth notes, the ‘relentless theme of Marx’s critique of liberal accomplishments is that these fail to 
overcome the underlying conditions that at once necessitate them and render largely illusory their benefits 
for the subordinate class’. Brad Roth, ‘Retrieving Marx for the Human Rights Project’ (2004) 17 Leiden Journal 
of International Law 31, 38.  
37 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Marx-Engels Collected Works: Volume 1 (Lawrence & Wishart 2010) 168; 
and see: ‘The Prussian Press Bill’ in Karl Marx, The Revolutions of 1848: Political Writings Volume 1 (Verso 2010) 
134. 
38 ‘Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the 
people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes … nothing could 
be more foreign to the spirit of the Commune than to supersede universal suffrage by hierarchical investiture’. 
Karl Marx, The First International and After: Political Writings Volume 3 (Verso 2010) 210-211. 
39 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Marx-Engels Collected Works: Volume 23 (Lawrence & Wishart 2010) 295. 
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Alongside these defences of rights in concrete instances, Marx, in his inaugural address to 
the International Workingman’s Association (the First International), invoked, in glowing 
terms, the struggle of the English working class for the Ten Hours Bill,40 noting that 
This struggle about the legal restriction of the hours of labor raged the 
more fiercely since, apart from frightened avarice, it told indeed upon the 
great contest between the blind rule of the supply and demand laws which 
form the political economy of the middle class, and social production 
controlled by social foresight, which forms the political economy of the 
working class. Hence the Ten Hours’ Bill was not only a great practical 
success; it was the victory of a principle; it was the first time that in broad 
daylight the political economy of the middle class succumbed to the 
political economy of the working class.41  
 
Later, in Capital, Marx returns to the struggle for the Ten Hour Bill, noting. approvingly, 
that in ‘place of the pompous catalogue of the “inalienable rights of man” there steps the 
modest Magna Carta of the legally limited working day, which at last makes clear “when 
the time which the worker sells is ended, and when his own begins”’.42  
 
Significantly, the Provisional Rules of the First International, which Marx also wrote, begins 
with the affirmation that ‘the struggle for the emancipation of the working classes means 
not a struggle for class privileges and monopolies, but for equal rights and duties, and the 
abolition of all class rule’.43 The Rules further ‘hold it the duty of a man to claim the rights 
of a man and a citizen, not only for himself, but for every man who does his duty’.44 Clearly, 
then, Marx’s stated views on rights throughout his life can best be described as ‘critical, 
differentiated, underdeveloped and, in more than a few instances, ambiguous’.45 All of 
which is to say that while Marx was certainly critical of human rights as lauded, liberal 
abstractions, he was also aware of their value and importance in political struggles to 
advance the interests of the working class. Nonetheless, the inconsistency in his statements 
on the matter led to important debates within the Marxist tradition about how human 
rights should be approached, and it is to these debates that we now turn. 
 
ii. Can a Marxist Support Human Rights? 
                                                 
40 Enacted as The Factory Act 1847. 
41 Marx (n 38) 79. 
42 Karl Marx, Capital: Volume 1 (Penguin Books 1990) 416. 
43 Marx (n 38) 82 [emphasis added]. 
44 ibid 83. 
45 Amy Bartholomew, ‘Should a Marxist Believe in Marx on Rights?’ (1990) Socialist Register 244, 247. 
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Following Marx’s death, the issue of human rights received relatively scant attention within 
the international socialist movements which his work inspired. The focus throughout the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries being, rather, on issues of economic theory, 
party building and social revolution. 46  However, in the early 1980s Steven Lukes 
reinvigorated the debate by asking whether Marxists could, consistent with what he termed 
‘the central doctrines essential to the Marxist canon’, believe in human rights.47 Lukes 
intervention was prompted by the bourgeoning popularity of human rights, ‘particularly in 
evidence on the left, and within the left, among Marxists’.48  
 
To answer the question, Lukes engaged in a survey of the statements of Marx, Engels, 
Lenin and others on questions of rights and law. From this he concluded that ‘Marx and 
Engels always wrote disparagingly about the language of rights and justice’.49 Added to this, 
and at a deeper level, Lukes argued that for Marx and subsequent Marxists, human rights 
are intolerable because they are ‘inherently ideological, stabilizing class societies and 
concealing class interests’.50 Consequently, for Lukes, it is not possible for Marxists to 
believe in human rights. 51  The language of belief adopted by Lukes is somewhat 
problematic, but the key point, in essence, is that, for him, it is not possible for Marxists 
to support human rights, and this is a view that was promptly contested.  
 
Critical reaction to Lukes argument was immediate: Drucilla Cornell pointed out that, as 
shown above, it was inaccurate to say that Marx and Engels had only ever written 
disparagingly of rights, as Lukes claimed. Instead, Cornell noted that ‘there are 
contradictory strains in Marx’s own attitude to legality’, and as such there was room for 
differing interpretations. 52  She further argued that Lukes had misunderstood Marx’s 
methodological approach to the question  
 
                                                 
46 Perry Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism (Verso 1979) 44-45. 
47 Lukes (n 29) 335. 
48 ibid 335. 
49 ibid 338. 
50 ibid. 
51 ibid 344. Since the publication of this article, Lukes has made, broadly, the same argument on several 
occasions: ‘Marxism and Morality: Reflections on the Revolution of 1989’ (1990) 4 Ethics & International 
Affairs 19; ‘On the Moral Blindness of Communism’ (2001) 2(2) Human Rights Review 113; and ‘Marxism and 
Morals Today’ (2015) 24(1) New Labor Forum 54. 
52 Drucilla Cornell, ‘Should a Marxist Believe in Rights?’ (1984) 4 Praxis International 45, 45. 
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According to Marx, the State represents the distorted reality of civil society. 
What has been actualized in the modern State is the contradiction between 
the abstract freedom of civil society and the true freedom of a fully 
emancipated citizenry. The resolution of the contradiction awaits a change 
in social reality, a change which Marx believed would be brought about by 
the class whose life graphically denied the purported reconciliation of 
substantive and abstract freedom in the State … Marx does not pit 
substantive freedom against the emptiness of formal right on the basis of 
what ought to be. The entire body of his work is devoted to showing that 
the contradiction between substantive and formal freedom is immanent in 
the nature of capitalist society itself.53 
 
Cornell concludes that it is only because Lukes has not understood Marx’s dialectical 
method in his critique of bourgeois right that he ‘fails to see how a belief in right can be 
reconciled with a politically sound interpretation of Marxism’.54 
 
In his response to Lukes, William McBride argued that while Marx fully understood, and 
identified, ‘the severe limitations of rights-talk’ this ‘does not preclude, logically speaking, 
either our resorting, within the Marxian tradition, to the language of rights in order to point 
up inconsistencies of practice in the sense of violations of asserted rights which abound 
within our present socio-economic-legal system, or our denominating certain fundamental 
particular practices of this system, even when they are consistently followed, as being 
wrong’.55 For McBride a Marxist could, thus, adopt or embrace some notion of human rights, 
so long as ‘one maintains a critical recognition of the ideological uses to which rights talk 
has traditionally been put’.56 
 
Finally, in response to Lukes, Amy Bartholomew argued that ‘by relying on Marx’s 
understanding of, and commitment to, the development of “rich individuality” and self-
development entailed in the notion of “human emancipation” … a basis may be found in 
Marx’s work in which to ground a positive commitment to rights’.57 Expanding on this 
point, she argues that 
                                                 
53 ibid 48. 
54 ibid 54. 
55 William McBride, ‘Rights and the Marxian Tradition’ (1984) 4 Praxis International 57, 70 [original emphasis]. 
56 ibid 70. 
57 Bartholomew (n 45) 246; and see Fromm (n 16). As Nancy Fraser argues: ‘individuality is a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, it is a mark of personhood and intrinsic value … On the other hand, it is easily 
made into a ruse of power, an instrument of domination. When divorced from a structural understanding of 
an exploitative social order, individuality can become a cult object, a substitute for critical thinking and an 
impediment to overcoming injustice’. Nancy Fraser, ‘On Justice’ (2012) 74 New Left Review 41, 48. 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in Human Rights Quarterly published by John Hopkins 
University Press: https://www.press.jhu.edu/journals/human-rights-quarterly  






While many existing rights may also encourage atomism and egoism, this 
is not a characteristic which is naturally and necessarily inscribed into their 
status as rights, or even as individual rights. Rather, the content and cultural 
meaning of a right may best be understood as the crystallization of past 
victories and defeats. The extent to which a right expresses and reinforces 
one rather than another form of individualism depends on the struggles 
and demands that are, and have been, made around, within and through 
it.58 
 
For these authors, then, there is ample scope within the Marxist tradition to argue for and 
defend human rights. Or, as Brad Roth puts it, for a ‘human rights friendly reading of Marx 
[which] is both available and edifying’. 59 Any such invocation of human rights must, 
however, pay close attention to the contradictory and problematic role that the language 
of human rights plays in the maintenance of the extant social order, and to the centrality 
of social struggle in framing human rights. 
 
iii. Should a Marxist Support Human Rights? 
If the foregoing establishes that, consistent with the Marxist tradition, one can support 
human rights, it still leaves open the strategic question as to whether one should. In this 
regard McBride, while responding to Lukes, argued forcefully that the ‘outright rejection 
of human rights’ would be ‘a practical blunder within the context of contemporary 
politics’.60 Effectively, McBride’s view was that while capitalism remained the dominant 
and unchallenged system, and prospects for moving beyond it seemed slim, human rights 
represented important gains that Marxists and others should defend.61 Others argued that 
the failed experience of the Soviet Union provided a stark lesson as to why Marxists should 
embrace and defend human rights. As Cornell put it, the painful experience ‘with the reality 
of a society which … purportedly transcended legality has … taught us about the 
continuing need for the institutionalization of right’.62 
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Similar arguments have been made in recent years. Prabhat Patnaik, for example, argues 
forcefully that socialists and Marxists should support a ‘rights based approach’ to 
development.63 Patnaik places significant emphasis on pushing for the recognition of 
welfare, or socio-economic, rights because the recognition of such rights fundamentally 
questions capitalist social relations. For Patnaik, the recognition of such rights can form 
part ‘of a series of measures that constitute a dialectics of subversion of the logic of 
capital’.64 Conscious of Marx’ oft-cited critiques of rights, Patnaik asks how can Marxists 
justify the adoption of a rights promoting strategy, and his answer is twofold:  
 
first, just as “democracy” in a bourgeois society serves to camouflage 
exploitation, just as “equality” in a bourgeois society is only the equality of 
commodity-owners in the marketplace, underlying which is the reality of 
exploitation, likewise “rights” in a bourgeois society are meant only to 
sustain a structure of exploitation. But this does not make “rights” 
meaningless, no more than it makes “democracy” or “equality” 
meaningless. On the contrary, just as “democracy” and “equality” can get 
realised only in a society transcending capitalism, i.e., in a socialist society, 
likewise “rights” too become meaningful only in a socialist society, which 
is why the left must struggle over ‘rights” in a bourgeois society, as it 
struggles over “democracy” and “equality”. Bourgeois society’s “hypocrisy” 
over rights therefore, far from robbing the concept of legitimacy, makes it 
an important transitional demand for the left.65 
 
Patnaik’s argument, then, is that in the contemporary global order, Marxists both can and 
should support human rights claims, notwithstanding the very real limitations of and 
problems with the language of human rights.  
 
Similar arguments are advanced by Robin Blackburn. In a piece discussing the origins of 
of human rights, he argues that ‘the abuse of human rights for great-power ends need not 
necessarily disqualify them as emancipatory tools’.66 Expanding on this, he argues that 
notwithstanding the ‘latter-day militarist and imperialist instrumentalisation of human 
rights discourse by Washington and its allies’, human rights ‘cannot be written off’.67 As 
he puts it 
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Just as the ‘rights of man’ or abolitionist demands were sometimes 
misappropriated in past centuries, so ‘humanitarianism’ has all too often 
been adopted as cover for post-Cold War militarism in recent times. It is 
necessary to disentangle the different uses of human rights and to register 
that cynical attempts to exploit its language are likely to backfire. If the 
discourse of human rights had never been more than diplomatic jargon, it 
would not have become hegemonic; and if it does end up being no more 
than such a jargon, it will have lost its hegemony. In practice, the language 
of rights is used to attract and maintain a following. Those who wage 
imperial wars in its name are adopting a risky strategy that can blow up in 
their faces. Equally obviously, movements of protest against torture, 
arbitrary arrest, imprisonment are desperately needed in many parts of the 
world. Those attacking the US or British governments for ‘rendition’ and 
the torture of suspects, or those claiming labour rights in China, find 
succour in human-rights language even if they would also need to reach 
beyond it.68 
 
In sum, then, Blackburn, like Patnaik, adopts a stance of ‘uncompromising realism’ as Perry 
Anderson terms it. 69  A position which can ‘support any local movements or limited 
reforms, without pretending that they alter the nature of the system’.70  
 
This is recognition that while human rights are routinely mobilised to protect and maintain 
the status quo, they are at the same time ‘emancipatory tools’ that can be directed against 
that same status quo. Blackburn concludes that human rights  
 
can serve as a valuable watchword and measure. But because inequality and 
injustice are structural, constituted by multiple intersecting planes of 
capitalist accumulation and realization, more needs to be said—especially 
in relation to financial and corporate power and how these might be curbed 
and socialized. The plight of billions can be represented as a lack of 
effective rights, but it is the ‘property question’ - the fact that the world is 
owned by a tiny elite of expropriators - that is constitutive of that plight. 
The slogan of rights takes us some way along the path; but it alone cannot 
pose the property question relevant to the 21st century.71 
 
In this way Blackburn echoes Marx’s fundamental critique of rights: which is to say that 
they cannot be realised, in any meaningful sense, under capitalism. However, in tune with 
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Bartholomew and others, he recognises the important role human rights can play in social 
and political struggles, and how these struggles, in turn, can transform understandings of 
human rights. There is, therefore, ample scope within the Marxist tradition for a critical 
embrace of human rights, in the next section with look at the insights and limitations from 
other critical accounts of human rights. 
 
III. CRITIQUES OF RIGHTS 
In an important recent article, Robin West bemoans what she sees as the disappearance of 
the radical critique of rights. As she puts it the ‘rights critique has … virtually disappeared 
from contemporary legal scholarship and pedagogy. We do not hear much, if anything, of 
rights’ wrongs anymore – of their subordinating, legitimating, and alienating effects’.72 
West raises an important issue, and her concern carries much weight in the US context, 
where many of the erstwhile radical critics of liberal rights, have either abandoned their 
project or, to one degree or another, become grudging advocates of rights. However, 
West’s more general contention is unfounded, as the critique of rights is alive and well. In 
large part because of their now hegemonic position, and because of their use to justify and 
legitimate all manner of imperial depredations, the language of rights continues to come in 
for considerable critique across the broad ‘left’. It is now, in certain circles, in vogue to be 
‘against’,73 or to dismiss human rights.74 Here we will consider the arguments in these 
radical critiques of rights, starting with a brief overview of the Critical Legal Studies critique 
of the 1980s, before going on to look at the more recent iterations, and then concluding 
this section by sounding some reservations about the value of these critiques.  
 
i. Critical Legal Studies and the Critique of Rights 
In the early 1980s the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement engaged in a sustained 
critique of the concept of rights.75 Some of the key aspects of the various CLS critiques 
were that rights, and rights talk, tended: (i) to insulate and valorise subordination in the 
private sphere, (ii) to legitimate, perpetuate and conceal greater injustice than they 
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addressed and (iii) that the language of rights tended to be atomistic and to alienate people 
from one another.76 A further, central element of the CLS critique was that human rights, 
as with all legal discourse, were inherently indeterminate. All of this stemmed from a ‘loss 
of faith in rights’ on the part of sections of the American left.77 
 
The first of these concerns is captured well by Peter Gabel and Paul Harris’s insistence 
that ‘the expansion of legal rights has only a limited impact on people’s real lives, and … 
even these limited gains can be wiped out by a change in the political climate’.78 The basic 
idea being that the formal recognition of rights, as such, does not lead to the fundamental 
material change in people’s wellbeing that naïve, liberal belief in rights implies. In this way, 
the formal recognition of rights in the public sphere can, and often does, leave untouched 
unequal relations of power in ‘civil society’.79 The second major critique is well captured 
by West, who argues that rights do harm because ‘they distract our critical gaze, thereby 
legitimizing larger injustices’. 80  Or, in other words, that a preoccupation with rights 
distracts us from addressing deeper, structural issues of inequality and injustice.  
 
With respect to the atomising character of rights discourse, Gabel and Harris argue 
forcefully that ‘an excessive preoccupation with “rights consciousness” tends in the long 
run to reinforce alienation and powerlessness, because the appeal to rights inherently 
affirms that the source of social power resides in the State rather than in the people 
themselves’.81 In other words, the language of rights reinforces an ideology and sense of 
self that, ultimately, serves to sustain the extant social order. Finally, with respect to the 
notion of indeterminacy, perhaps the most significant contribution of CLS, Morton 
Horowitz notes that the inherent tension in liberal rights discourse between commitment 
to subjective normative values and the attempt to present rights in objective, neutral, terms 
has led to ‘an ungrounded conception of rights that allows anyone to propose his or her 
favourite right. Thus, it seems to be part of the indeterminate nature of rights discourse 
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that it can be deployed with equal logic to protect the existing structure of privilege as well 
as to challenge and legitimate that structure’.82 
 
ii. The Critique of Rights Today 
These, then, were the main lines of the CLS critique of human rights developed in the 
1980s. For a variety of reasons, among which we could number the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the triumph (in the forms of Clinton and Blair) of Third Way liberalism, these critiques 
of rights did fall somewhat out of fashion. However, following the election of George W. 
Bush as president of the US and the illegal US-led invasion of Iraq, a new wave of human 
rights critiques emerged. One prominent account was articulated by David Kennedy, who 
argued, following in the CLS tradition, that  
 
Even very broad social movements of emancipation–for women, for 
minorities of various sorts, for the poor–have their vision blinkered by the 
promise of recognition in the vocabulary and institutional apparatus of 
human rights. They will be led away from the economy and toward the 
state, away from political/social conditions and toward the forms of legal 
recognition.83 
 
For this and other reasons, Kennedy concluded, reluctantly, that human rights and the 
extant ‘human rights movement’, might, on balance, be ‘more a part of the problem in 
today’s world than part of the solution’.84 
 
Similar misgivings about human rights have been expressed by another prominent 
international lawyer, Martti Koskenniemi; for him, one of the fundamental problems with 
human rights is that it is a language which can be mobilised by both sides in any given 
dispute or argument. 85  As a result the value of human rights language in effecting 
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meaningful change is undermined and, for Koskenniemi, individuals and movements 
should look to other languages, such as economics, to advance their causes. 86  With 
Kennedy and Koskenniemi we have a restatement of key elements of the earlier CLS 
critique: namely that rights are indeterminate, and do not touch the real, material causes of 
injustice and inequality. From Wendy Brown, and others, we also get a restatement of the 
idea that human rights are problematic because they entrench forms of individuality and 
subjectivity which, on balance, tend to sustain the status quo.87 Likewise, Zizek and others 
argue that the language of human rights mainly provides an ideological apologia for Western 
imperial interventions around the world.88 In this way, ‘human rights practice essentially 
results in both the reproduction and strengthening of the very state-governing apparatuses 
it confronts, and as a result ultimately undermines its own aims’.89 From all of this, it 
follows, that movements for fundamental social change should be sceptical of and eschew 
the language of human rights, and instead should focus on other emancipatory discourses. 
 
iii. The Limits of Critique 
The first thing that needs to be said about these critical accounts of human rights is that 
they raise crucially important and valid critiques of dominant liberal discourses of human 
rights. With that said, these critiques also fall short in several important ways. Three of the 
main shortcomings in these critiques are: (i) the overemphasis on the dominant narrative 
of human rights; (ii) the idealistic nature of the critiques (in the sense that they are, in the 
first instance, an engagement with and critique of ideas and concepts in the abstract) and 
(iii) the divorce of this critique from concrete struggles. Each of these shortcomings, more 
pronounced in some cases than others, reduces these critical accounts to a sort of radical 
quietism; a stance which decries the extant order, without conceiving or countenancing 
any meaningful alternative. 
 
The indeterminacy critique, highlighting the atavistic forms of individuality at the heart of 
mainstream accounts of human rights and the cynical deployment of human rights to 
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justify imperialist depredations are all valid. The problem, however, is when these 
legitimate critiques of liberal/dominant rights discourses evolve into a rejection of rights 
as such. It is undeniable, as Blackburn puts it, that human rights are cynically deployed for 
‘great-power ends’, 90  that liberal rights discourse entrenches a truncated form of 
individuality,91 and that rights are not the neutral, determinate rules that liberal legalism 
pretends to. 92  All of this, however, merely demonstrates the inaccuracy of the self-
perception of dominant human rights discourses, and says little or nothing about how 
movements striving for fundamental social change can or should engage with the language 
and concept of rights as such.  
 
Tied to this one-sidedness is the idealistic character of these rights critiques. In a rather 
scathing manor, Anthony Chase highlighted this shortcoming in the context of the first 
wave CLS critique of rights in the 1980s. As Chase sardonically put it 
 
Nothing is more striking about the literary criticism approach than the 
unwillingness or inability of its practitioners to provide concrete historical 
and sociological studies of instances where the “self-confidence” or “self-
activity” of radical social movements (whether in the Americas, Europe, 
Africa, Asia, or the Middle East) have actually been “crushed”, not by 
arduous working conditions or impoverization, not by the inability of civil 
society to impose civil rights and liberties against state power, not by police 
surveillance or death squads, not by famine or inadequate public health 
services, not by the dull necessity of economic reproduction, not by armed 
invasions, prison and torture cells, or “surgical air strikes” against villages 
and cities, but, rather extraordinarily, by the central target of CLS critique: 
appellate judicial reasoning in the liberal mode. The enormous emphasis 
upon and exclusive focus given to the rhetoric of judges in (apparently) 
maintaining empires, civilizations, and the fabric of societies, has made 
CLS a unique form of social theory (if one may call it that), in existence 
hardly anywhere outside of the cloistered legal academy.93 
 
Though caustic, Chase’s insight is valid and important. It is not the language of human 
rights that sustains the extant social order, though it can and does play a part in the broader 
ideological apparatus, but an array of material relationships. Critiques of rights in the broad 
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CLS tradition routinely lose sight of this, and become trapped in a hall of mirrors where 
the enemy is a discourse, rather than the material relationships that structure discourses 
one way or another.94  
 
Finally, then, these critiques are lacking because they are divorced from concrete struggles 
and the ideas which animate such struggles. So, for example, it is true to say that rights can 
have myriad different meanings in the abstract, but in concrete cases they are given a 
specific meaning. This meaning is fought over and determined in and through social 
struggles, which sometimes make their way to the rarefied environs of the courtroom, but 
are not limited to this. The critique of rights, in the abstract, loses much of its veracity and 
efficacy when the messiness of political and social struggles have to be accounted for. One 
way, then, in which the shortcomings of human rights, rightly highlighted by these critiques, 
can be addressed, is through embracing a substantive political or social vision of change. 
As Morton Horwitz argued, the ‘most promising way to ensure that rights may be used on 
behalf of the socially weak, and to mitigate … undesirable long-term risks of rights 
conceptions, is to ground rights theory in a substantive conception of the good society’.95  
 
In a similar vein, Karl Klare, reflecting on the CLS tradition after the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall, argued that perhaps ‘the best conclusion is that rights discourse needs to be 
transformed, not abandoned; that its individualism should be tempered by an infusion of 
communitarian and egalitarian values; and that rights discourse must be made more 
sensitive to issues of gender and cultural difference’.96 Divorced from concrete struggles 
and visions of an alternative world, critiques of rights end up accepting, much like the 
theories they critique, the extant, capitalist order as their perennial premise.97 In the next 
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section, we will see how, by shifting our understanding of rights and situating it within the 
broader, emancipatory theory of Marxism, it is possible to mobilise the language of rights 
without succumbing to the siren call of liberal legalism.  
 
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS, CAPITALISM AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY 
Two key points emerge from the foregoing. First, within the broad Marxist tradition there 
is scope to defend and mobilise the language of human right. Second, though critiques of 
human rights abound, these critiques are limited and do not speak to the concrete struggles 
that exploited and subordinate groups around the world are engaged in today. Following 
on from this, the rest of this article is devoted to providing the tentative outlines of a way 
of approaching human rights from within the Marxist tradition. It is an approach that gives 
priority to three key principles: (i) recognition that the causes of what we see as human 
rights violations around the world today are structurally embedded in the system of global 
capitalism; (ii) from a methodological perspective, understanding the nature of 
contradiction in social phenomena, and for present purposes in relation to human rights; 
and (iii) the centrality of social and political struggles for determining the meaning and 
content of rights in particular contexts.  
 
On the first point, it is not possible in a single article to fully unpack this, but there is ample 
literature available,98 to demonstrate, as Thomas Pogge has argued, that the structures 
created by neoliberal globalisation have produced ‘a supranational institutional regime that 
foreseeably produces massive and reasonably avoidable human rights deficits’.99 In myriad 
ways the system of global capitalism reproduces itself in ways that undermine the entire 
corpus of human rights. This, in turn, means that discreet campaigns and struggles around 
specific rights issues are also, sometimes more clearly than others, struggles against the 
extant system. It also means that, long-term, the meaningful attainment of human rights 
will require transcending the extant system. Accepting this as a major premise, the next 
three sections set out some methodological points about how we should approach human 
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rights, and looks at two, broad, contexts in which embracing human rights can be part of 
challenging the overall system.  
 
i. The Future in the Present: Rights, Struggle and Contradiction 
Implicit in critiques of human rights, and explicit in some cases, is the idea that the language 
of human rights should be jettisoned, and projects of emancipatory politics advanced 
through some other, presumably less compromised, language. The problem with this, as 
Patnaik pointed out above, is that under capitalism, every conceivable discourse will be 
compromised and limited by dint of the conditions under which it must be deployed. 
Under capitalism, as Marx pointed out, the language of rights will necessarily fall short of 
its grand promise. But, there is no reference point outside of capitalism from which we 
can begin to construct alternatives to it. As David Harvey notes, change ‘arises out of an 
existing state of affairs and it has to harness the possibilities immanent within the existing 
situation’.100 In a similar vein, Terry Eagleton argues that emancipatory politics ‘inserts the 
thin end of the wedge of the future into the heart of the present’.101 But, of course, this 
future can only begin to be built in the present, a ‘different future has to be the future of 
this particular present. And most of the present is made up of the past. We have nothing 
with which to fashion a future other than the few, inadequate tools we have inherited from 
history’.102 
 
Human rights are one of the key ‘inadequate tools’ we have at our disposal today. In 
mobilising human rights we have to be conscious of the contradictory nature of human 
rights, and of the centrality of social struggle in forming and advancing them. The former 
allows us to break with the debilitating quietism of unmoored critique, and the latter 
insures we foreground the politics of human rights (and of law) in our assessments of 
concrete struggles and controversies. The mistake many critiques make is to present the 
dominant, liberal narrative of human rights, demonstrate the ways in which reality falls 
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short of this ideal, and from this conclude that rights are illusory, providing an ideological 
mask for the status quo, and, therefore, should be dropped.  
 
The problem with this approach is that it lacks a sufficient understanding of contradiction, 
in the sense of a concrete contradiction, not just one of formal logic. The point is spelt out 
by Sean Sayers, who argues that 
 
All concrete things are contradictory. There are tensions and conflicts 
within all things and in the relations between things. This is the law of 
contradiction, which is the most universal expression of the philosophy of 
dialectics and also the least well understood. … it is vital to understand that 
the dialectical concept of contradiction is not the same as the concept of 
contradiction in traditional formal logic. … The dialectical contradiction is 
a concrete contradiction: it is a contradiction which exists not just between 
ideas or propositions, but in things.103  
 
He goes on to argue that ‘things which are merely positive, which merely are what they 
are, are abstract and dead. Nothing concrete and real is merely positive. Everything is 
contradictory and contains negatives well as positive aspects within it. The dialectical 
notion of contradiction is that such conflicts between opposed aspects are necessary and 
essential’.104 
 
This insight of general application, that all real things are contradictory, applies equally to 
human rights. As Ed Sparer puts it ‘the potential contribution of human rights … coexists 
with their negative potential’.105 Similarly, Balakrishnan Rajagopal argues that the language 
of rights is ‘a language of both power and resistance. It is a language of hegemony and 
counter-hegemony and we need to recognize the multiple uses to which it is put and the 
fact that it is a terrain of contestation … for multiple deployments of both power and 
resistance’.106 Whereas the majority of critiques seek to iron out the imperfections, or 
disdain human rights for falling short of the impossible standards of liberal legalism, we 
do better to simply recognise that these contradictions are inevitable. 
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Crucially, though, we must take one more step. Rejecting the sterile maximalism of 
unmoored critique, and acknowledging the inherently contradictory character of human 
rights is insufficient unless we also stress the centrality of social struggle in shaping the 
concrete meaning of rights in specific contexts. The point is hinted at by Rajagopal above, 
but made even more forcefully by Sparer, who argues that  
 
The notion of a ‘legal right’ is one which can affirm and defend human 
autonomy and solidarity or merely give the appearance of such autonomy 
and solidarity while in fact excusing oppression. Various kinds of legal 
rights and entitlements may be used in a manner that helps to develop 
social movement, which in turn leads to expanded opportunities for a more 
humane society, or they may be used to help frustrate social movement by 
legitimating existing relationships. The meaning of a right or entitlement depends 
upon the way in which it intertwines with social movement’.107 
 
Rights, then, must be understood as struggle concepts,108 a terrain in which the interests of 
different groups are fought over. Starting from this understanding, rights are not imbued 
with some essential, trans-contextual essence, instead they are defined and re-defined in 
the very struggles over their meaning.109 
 
From this perspective, then, human rights cannot be blithely dismissed as a sham, or 
ideological apologia for the status quo. They often are these things, but at the very same time 
they provide a language for critiquing and challenging the extant social order. In light of 
this, Sparer calls on us to build upon  
 
the dialectics of struggle which builds upon the best of what has gone 
before … We would do well to follow the radical approach of building 
upon our core human rights tradition, demonstrating the contradiction 
between that tradition and our social institutions, and developing ways to 
fuse human rights into new cooperative institutions of our own making. 
Such work require a concern for theory which feeds social movement, but 
successful social movement comes from the struggle for the realization of 
our basic rights, not from their disparagement.110 
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The next two sections look at specific contexts in which the language of human rights 
could be mobilised (and in certain instances already is being mobilised) to defend discrete 
claims and interests, in a way which also calls into question the wider social system.  
 
ii. The Fight for Democracy  
It is important to remember that the modern world system was liberal and capitalist long 
before it was in any meaningful way democratic.111 With that said, the last forty years, in 
line with the expansion of neoliberal capitalism, has seen a steady erosion of democracy 
across the advanced capitalist world. 112  Along with the decline of representation and 
accountability in parliamentary democracy, we have seen the steady erosion of civil and 
political rights,113 in part because of the so-called ‘war on terror’,114 but also as part of a 
general drift towards authoritarian neoliberalism. 115  These tendencies, which were 
unfolding in any event, may now, following the election of Donald Trump as president of 
the US and broader global trends, accelerate in the coming years.116 
 
In this context, there are two overlapping reasons why the defence of civil and political 
rights is important. The first is that the system of global capitalism is fundamentally 
incompatible with democracy, as such, the expansion of democracy, and of democratic 
rights and practices, is a challenge to the extant order. As Erik Olin Wright argues ‘the 
central axis for transcending capitalism is democracy’.117 Related to this, the struggle for 
civil and political rights also provides space for subordinate and exploited groups to 
develop the political power to fundamentally challenge the order of things, and begin 
working to transcend the status quo. Engels was aware of this when he wrote that  
 
The bourgeoisie cannot gain political supremacy and express this in the 
form of a constitution without, at the same time, arming the proletariat. 
On its banner it must inscribe human rights in place of the old system of 
social position based on birth … for consistency’s sake, it must demand 
universal and direct suffrage, freedom of the press, association and 
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assembly and the repeal of all emergency laws directed against particular 
social classes. But this is all that the proletariat need demand from the 
bourgeoisie. It cannot expect the bourgeoisie to stop being the bourgeoisie, 
but it can demand that it apply its own principles consistently. The result 
will be that the proletariat will lay its hands on all the weapons which it 
needs for its final victory. With the help of the freedom of the press and 
the right of association and assembly it will win universal suffrage, and by 
way of universal and direct suffrage, together with the means of agitation 
mentioned above, it will achieve everything else.118  
 
In this way, the classic rights of liberalism, which can easily be co-opted and rendered 
meaningless, can also serve as important tools to allow subordinate groups to challenge 
the extant social order.  
 
In the context of an increasingly authoritarian turn in global politics, the defence and 
protection of civil and political rights will be crucially important. If oppositional 
movements are to emerge and flourish, then the defence of such rights, notwithstanding 
their capacity for co-optation, will be essential. This point is made well by Sparer, who 
argued that  
 
It is not the social legitimization which flows from the formal recognition 
of rights that inhibits transformative, humanizing social struggle. Many 
factors impede such struggle. But rights such as free speech and dissent 
protect the ability of groups of people – including working people – to 
change their society, better their group situation, and expand their human 
freedom.119 
 
It is possible, and necessary, in the contemporary era to fight for civil and political rights 
without illusions. To recognise that such rights are, in large part, an achievement of mass 
movements,120 and a necessary precondition for building movements to transcend the 
existing order.121 
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iii. Decommodification Rights  
Finally, we turn to the role that socio-economic rights can play in building movements that 
challenge the contemporary global order. The focus here is on one discrete, but 
fundamentally important aspect of the capitalist system. At the heart of capitalism is the 
pursuit of profit, one extension of this is an effort to commodify ‘the entire life course’.122 
Indeed the last forty years of so called globalisation and neoliberalism have been little more 
than the expansion of this logic of commodification through privatisation and various 
other mechanisms. If, then, commodification and the transformation of essential public 
goods and services into commodities is at the heart of the system, then, as Watts argues, 
any ‘radicalism with credible claims to be representative of the Left must have as a 
reference point a critical stance toward capital, a formulation which sees a resistance to the 
commodity world as a refusal of capitalism’s basic impulses’.123  
 
It is for this reason that Patnaik places particular emphasis on struggles for socio-economic 
rights, as he puts it the 
 
provision of welfare to the people in an ad hoc manner is always 
compatible with capitalism, since it is always reversible. But the provision 
of welfare as a right to the people is fundamentally incompatible with 
capitalism. And it is precisely why no bourgeois government can accept a 
rights-based approach to development; and this is also precisely why the 
left has to adopt a rights-based approach to development which sets it 
qualitatively apart from all bourgeois formations and, by unleashing a 
dialectics of subversion of the logic of capital, prepares the ground for a 
transition to socialism … Liberal theory is unable to go beyond the 
confines of capitalism; it takes capitalism as its perennial premise and hence 
denies any rights that the bourgeois state cannot guarantee. The left 
position by contrast must take certain basic rights, for example rights to 
minimum bundles of commodities, services, and material security … as its 
premise and hence not confine itself to the boundaries of bourgeois society. 
This is exactly what a rights-based approach seeks to do; and 
notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary such an approach can 
never be accepted by any bourgeois formation.124 
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If commodification and market dependence are ‘the essence of the system’,125 then claims 
that certain things (goods and services) are so fundamental to human flourishing that they 
should be exempted from market rationality, can introduces a logic of 
decommodification,126 which poses a fundamental challenge to the existing order. 
 
Such a conception of socio-economic rights is one which goes beyond established 
doctrinal accounts,127 and instead draws on the articulations of social movements engaged 
in struggles for their vital interests. In this way, struggle remains centre stage and works to 
advance claims around particular interests, but also, as Patnaik argues, to provide a political 
education of the communities and groups involved. As he puts it 
 
Political praxis on the part of the people … is the weapon for 
transcending … capitalism. In this struggle, every welfare gain they make 
strengthens them. And since “rights” are guarantors of welfare gains, every 
winning of “rights” likewise strengthens them. The acquisition of “rights” 
on the part of the people, including rights to minimum bundles of goods, 
services and security, amounts therefore to winning crucial battles in the 
class war for the transcendence of capitalism. The left’s putting on its 
agenda a struggle for people’s “rights”, adopting a “rights based approach” 
to development as opposed to the “means-based approach” of the 
bourgeois … constitutes therefore not a retreat into humanism but an 
integral part of the dialectics of subversion of the logic of capital.128 
 
In the contemporary era of austerity and commodification, communities struggling for 
water, housing, health care and food find that their immediate struggle also requires 
thinking about broader, structural issues. The assertion of a human right, in these contexts, 
becomes, of necessity, a rejection of the logic of the market, of the basic impulse of the 
capitalist system.  
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Critiques of human rights highlight crucial shortcomings in the dominant, liberal discourse. 
However, shifting the frame of reference and situating discussions of human rights within 
a Marxist tradition that emphasises contradiction, social struggle, and the need to transcend 
the system which structurally undermines human flourishing, opens a way of 
understanding human rights that can support movements for radical social change. Of 
course, the assertion of human rights will not bring about fundamental transformation in 
and of itself,129 but they can play an important role in broader struggles to do that. In the 
early 1990s Anthony Chase argued that in the coming century a ‘crucial confrontation will 
occur between essentially authoritarian public and private power, on the one hand, and 
rights-based anti-systemic movements, on the other’. 130  His observations may prove 
prescient, and if that is the case, then it is clear that movements for fundamental change 
will need to draw on radical, emancipatory theories, such as Marxism, in order to avoid the 
pitfalls of liberal legalism.  
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